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SOME CONSERVATIVE VIEWS UPON THE JUDI-
CIARY AND JUDICIAL RECALL
The New York County Lawyers' Association recently ap-
pointed a Special Committee to investigate the causes of discon-
tent with our judicial system and the manner in which justice is
administered, and to recommend the abatement of evils, if any,
and the correction of weaknesses, if any.
As a member of that Committee I concurred in its report, the
substance of which was in part that a large part of the recent agi-
tation is due to an endeavor, in spite of conflicting views, to settle
the boundary between the public interest under the police power
and the individual right to due process of law; that the doctrine
of judicial recall appears largely to have spent its force; that the
doctrine of the popular recall of judicial decisions is not rational
and in practice would disappoint even its advocates; that both of
said projects of recall menace judicial integrity as well as judicial
independence; that the power of the Courts to pass upon the con-
stitutionality of legislation has been widely recognized since the
very foundation of our Government, both State and Federal, and
its denunciation as a usurpation is a falldcy; and that the power
should exist to prevent the Legislature from being the ultimate
arbiter of the extent of its own powers.
The Committee recommended that judges be compelled (doubt-
less by the force of public opinion) to recognize that no law
hould be held unconstitutional unless it clearly transcends the
legislative power; that the Federal Supreme Court be authorized
to review State judgments; holding that State laws violate the
Federal Constitution; that when a State Statute is assailed in
the Courts, its Attorney General should have an opportunity to
be heard; that the freest criticism of the Bench and its decisions
be encouraged; that impeachment and removal be made a ready
remedy; and that more care be observed by Legislatures in the
form of bills.
But the consideration of the subject of the report necessary to
an adequate judgment provoked upon my part the following ad-
ditional reflections concerning the much-discussed question of the
recall of the judiciary and the grounds of the agitation,
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THE JUDICIAL POWER AND DUTY TO REGARD THE FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUTION AS THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND.
The greatest part of the recent agitation has arisen from the
exercise of this power, and many violent, ill-founded and ill-con-
sidered views have been expressed condemning it as a usurpation.
I am such a firm believer in the wisdom of our institutions as
designed by the framers of the Federal Constitution that I am
unwilling and unable to concede to those who would modify them
as much of an excuse as many persons appear to concede that they
have. As for the contention .that the judiciary has usurped any
function in declaring legislation unconstitutional, appeal should
not only be made to precedent and established usage, but to the
logic of a fundamental supreme law. The conclusion seems to
me unavoidable that it is unthinkable that the power to disregard
a law passed in defiance of a constitutional prohibition or a con-
stitutional limitation of legislative authority should not reside
with a judge who is sworn pursuant to the Constitution, to sup-
port the latter and whose duty is thereby declared to regard it as
the supreme law. It appears logically impossible to conceive that
the power to refuse to give effect to a legislative act in defiance
of a constitutional prohibition is not resident in a body who are
made to take oath' either actually or in substance, that they will
support the Constitution including its prohibitions or to whom it
says that it is and must be the supreme law.2
Therefore, there is really no need to point to or rely upon either
precedent or usage to establish the proposition. If it w ere ap-
proached anew it would still establish itself, that the judiciary
under a written Constitution containing prohibitions which they
are sworn to regard as the supreme law, are the possessors of the
power to give legal effect to its prohibitions by diregarding laws
passed in defiance of them. Any criticism of the exercise of this
power is a criticism of the Constitution, and not of those who
give effect to it. There are those who thoughtlessly urge that it
is a power which should be exercised with wisdom, but this im-
plies that its exercise can, when it seems inexpedient, be avoided;
it suggests that it should be used when it seems wise to use it and
declined when it seems wise to let it fall into disuse. Such, how-
ever, is not the duty of a judge. It is his duty to use the power
I E. g., N. Y. Const., Art. XIII, s. 1; U. S. Judiaciary Act of 1789, s. 8;
U. S. Rev. Stats., s. 712; U. S. Judicial Code, s. 257.
2 U. S. Const., Art VI, s. 2.
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when the facts present a case where the power exists; it is the
right of each litigant to invoke that power and to insist upon its
use; he does not resort to the Court for constitutional indication
in its discretion, but to learn from it whether the case is one in
which its power exists. If the Court determines that the power
exists in respect to the situation presented, it is the right of the
individual litigant to secure its exercise. It is, therefore, not a
power to be used with so-called wisdom, but to be used whenso-
ever its possessor determines that it ixists under the Constitution
in respect to the case made before it. It may and does take in-
telligence, knowledge and accuracy of perception to determine
whether the case presents a violation of a constitutional prohibi-
tion, but in such case no amount of wisdom would justify a judge
in refusing to declare null and void a legislative act which violates
a constitutional prohibition.
It has been claimed that there is a growing tendency in the
Courts to condemn as unconstitutional legislation designed to
promote social welfare. This proposition should not be conceded,
but rather that there is a growing tendency among legislators to
disregard constitutional prohibitions in enacting legislation to
please certain, and perhaps a majority or powerful minority, of
their constituents. Let us consider the effect of giving legislators
free scope.
The Constitution prohibits the quartering of soldiers in time of
peace upon civilians. This was an evil to which individuals had
been frequently subjected by arbitrary authority against which
they could make no headway, and which was yet unjust; its ex-
cuse was undoubtedly the social welfare, but it bore unevenly and
unjustly upon individuals. If a Legislature should by unanimous
action determine, in order to avoid levying a direct State tax, to
quarter one soldier upon every fourth civilian in the State and
the act should be declared unconstitutional by the judiciary, this
would not illustrate a growing tendency upon the part of the lat-
ter, but of the Legislature; it would be a growing tendency on its
part to avoid distributing public burdens equitably. So, also,
when, in the guise of improving the social welfare, it attempts to
fix upon an individual a burden for the benefit of another individ-
ual, and the quartering of the latter upon the former is likewise
forbidden by a constitutional prohibition, it is the legislative ten-
dency to act unjustly or at least unconstitutionally that is em-
phasized by a judicial exercise of the power and the duty to de-
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clare such legislation unconstitutional. Any one who is cogniz-
ant of the long line of abuses of the past, by which supreme in-
justice was done, not only to individuals, but to society through
the arbitrary oppression of its individual members, will readily
recognize what a great boon to society the concept of protection
to the individual through process of law was. And when
this concept was embodied in a written Constitution or guaranty,
its continued observance marked a substantial advance in the
peace and prosperity of the individuals making up the commun-
ity; they were free from the mere aggressions of arbitrary power.
When the good of the community is urged in favor of violating
a constitutional guaranty, the way to achieve the good (if good it
is) is to abrogate the guaranty in constitutional ways, instead of
abusing the judiciary for upholding the Constitution, as it is
sworn to do in a solemn compact with the people, signalized by
an oath, before being permitted to assume the office.8
In respect to causes of discontent, I have for several years been
observing and gathering data from several sources. Obviously
there is widespread discontent in respect to our judicial sytsem,
and the manner in which justice is administered. These causes
are numerous, and they operate differently upon different classes
and in different parts of the community for different reasons; al-
though they co-operate to produce the sum total of discontent.
THE INJUNCTION.
The first, and until recently the most numerous class to be dis-
contented, were those who claimed that the power of injunction is
abused. This is, however, now overshadowed by the complaint
against the so-called annulment of legislative acts.
When men propose to commit violence in order to accomplish
their purposes, and to do an injury to coerce an opponent into do-
ing their will, and their opponent invokes the judicial power to
protect him against their threatened activity, and the judge ap-
pealed to finds that the law does in theory and should in fact pro-
tect the postulant, the defeated and their sympathizers denounce
the judge instead of the law. They consider themselves the vic-
tims of injustice, become discontented with the judiciary, because.
it enforces the law against threatening violence and doing injury.
This was recently the most widespread cause for criticism of the
3E. g., N. Y. Const., Art. XIII, s. 1; U. S. Judiciary Act 1789, s. 8;
U. S. Rev. Stats., s. 712; U. S. Judicial Code, s. 257.
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judiciary. It finds its excuse in the belief that there should exist
a privilege of violence, when utilized to improve the condition of
a large and united class in the community. Our law hftherto has
not recognized such a privilege, and our judicial remedies hither-
to have been sufficient to prevent its exercise. The cases in which
this power has been used, have been relatively few, but very con-
spicuous.
As the aggressors have in many instances themselves been the
victims of selfish and oppressive treatment, the discontent at their
receiving a judicial set-back in the commission of an unlawful act,
has been directed at the judiciary, which has done its lawful duty;
and many sympathizers have shared the discontent, largely be-
cause of the identity of the litigants, rather than the merits of
their respective sides of the particular controversy.
Whether violence promotes social welfare, is perhaps a sub-
ject which statesmen may properly discuss, but the time has not
arrived yet when judges may properly refuse to use the power
committed to them to prevent violence and injury to those pos-
sessed of rights, in order that the social welfare of the wrong-
doers may be promoted.
This cause of discontent I would catalogue as the determina-
tion that the law should recognize the right of the discontented
to injure those against whom their activities are directed. As I
can see no merit in the proposition so stated, I have no recom-
mendation for its remedy, except to suggest that the power of
judges to punish for contempt is one which should not be unlim-
ited nor unregulated; that it may be arbitrarily exercised, and
that it might well be curtailed and carefully regulated by law,
not in the interest of unrestricted violefnce, but for the protection
of a reasonable liberty.
"€SOCIALC LEGISLATION.
The most widely spread discontent arises from the inaugura-
tion of legislative measures designed to do good to the commun-
ity, through doing good to one of its classes, without regard to
the injury which may be done to another. This class of remedies
has the merit of legislative sanction, which mere acts of violence
have not. But this class is peculiarly like the quartering of sol-
diers on individuals for the good of the community. Its defect
lies in the fact that it selects an individual for the victim. That
society can do for society what it will is not denied by the Judi-
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ciary nor by the Constitution, provided that society furnishes the
means, and does not saddle the individual with the duty while
society gets the benefit. Society may take private property for
public benefit, but society must, under the Constitution, recom-
pense the man from whom it is taken. It is a highly civilized
community in which society can be induced not to sacrifice the
weakest individual by making him yield to the arbitrary demands
of society. Society has developed through long ages in which ar-
bitrary power did not hesitate at violence or injustice. And the
individual man, not possessed of power, was the distressed victim
not of society, but of arbitrary power. Fortunately for us and
our country hitherto there were curbs upon arbitrary power,
which the'individual might invoke through the judiciary to pre-
vent his own sacrifice to its demands. And this was for the
good, and not to the detriment of society; for society was made
up of individual men, all similarly protected, without discrimina-
tion under the Constitutions.
Society was always capable of improvement, however, by tak-
ing thought, and the thoughtful have resorted to the Legislatures
and the Legislatures have been won over, and have enacted the
demands of those- who haVe taken thought, only to find the de-
mands thwarted in the Courts by the determination of unconstitu-
tionality, and this has awakened the present clamor against the
Courts, the Constitution and the Judiciary; a clamor more wide-
spread than that which arises from the so-called abuse of the in-
junction; a clamor which includes social workers and others who
would not advocate unrestrained violence, but who do neverthe-
less advocate unrestrained legislation. But the very fact that leg-
islation is declared in contravention of constitutional principles
which it has taken ages to work out for the benefit of the peace
and happiness of society should cause some sober reflection
whether society has not made a mistake in attempting legislation
for the benefit of a class in society, which appears to the Judici-
ary at least to override philosophic principles that have been the
outgrowth of hard-bought experience under the opposite princi-
ples. Legislatures and social welfare workers should heed the
warning voices of the past, as much as judges who are sworn to
do it. It appeared to Herod a certain -way to get rid of the pros-
pective King of the Jews; if he should kill all infants under two
years of age in Bethlehem and all the coasts thereof ;4 but not-
4 Matt. II., 16.
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withstanding all of the unjustified slaughter he failed of his pur-
pose. The most obvious way of accomplishing a given purpose is
not always the best. And when it becomes apparent that a pro-
posed measure runs counter to a safeguard established after ages
of experience for the good of the community, it is wise to stop
and ask whether the end might not be attained while preserving
the principle.
The social worker, and the legislator who aids his good intent,
have, it seems to me, lost sight of this fact. The gypsy moth
is said to have been introduced into New England to do unmeas-
ured destruction, through the accidental breaking of a net in
which it was confined for experimental purposes by an investi-
gating biologist. The Constitution gives the Judiciary the power,
and requires its exercise, to prevent the spread of legislative gypsy
moths.
It is the Legislature which determines whether a measure is for
the good of society, but the Judiciary still holds the screen to
prevent the escape of the gypsy moth. The Judiciary does not
inquire whether it is for the good of society, but whether it is a
gypsy moth. Even the police power, in this view of the Consti-
tution, is confined by the constitutional screen, and tle Legisla-
ture, which is prohibited to trandscend the Constitution, should be
justly governed by its bounds and caught within its meshes.
It is not for the Judiciary to say whether the Constitution ought
to be, for it is; they did not make it, but they each swore to up-
hold it, before they were permitted to assume office, and the
Legislature is not, nor are a clamorous and racous-voiced few
empowered to release them from their oath. New York is typical
of the most extreme conflict between the Legislature, enacting
measures at the behest of one class to accomplish a fancied good,
and the Courts doing what they conceive to be their sworn duty
to uphold the Constitution against legislative attacks. The Legis-
lature has unsuccessfully attempted to prohibit tht making of
cigars in tenement houses,5 to prohibit the sale of railroad tickets
by any except common carriers,6 to prohibit the manufacture or
sale of oleomargerine, 7 to prohibit women from working in fac-
tories between 9 p. m. and 68 a. m., to impose upon one man the
5Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y., 98.
6 People ex rel. Tyroler v. Warden, 157 N. Y., 116.
7 People v. Marx, 99 N. Y., 377.
8 People v. Williams, 189 N. Y., 131.
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duty of paying a pension to another,9 to restrict the business of
soliciting insurance to those engaged in limited lines of other
business,10 and to prevent a man from acting as agent in the sa!e
of real- property unless his authority is committed to writing."'
Each of these legislative attempts has been thwarted by a Ju-
diciary sworn to uphold the Constitution and each has been a
gypsy moth capable, according to the Judiciary, of working the
destruction of the peace and happiness of the community by tak-
ing away from an individual something which was rightfully his.
When the Legislature in the interest of a class, restricts the pre-
viously lawful activities of another class, it injures the class re-
stricted, and while it may benefit certain of its constituents, it
may injure the true peace of society. Constitutions, with their
prohibitions of certain legislative activity, exist for the well-being
of the entire community as a whole; they have been worked out
through hard-bought experiences, and have been established by
the regularly authorized representatives of the whole peop'e.
The prohibition of cigar making in tenement houses, deprives a
large and industrious part of the community of a reasonable op-
portunity to make a livelihood; it restricts the making of cigars to
those who can afford to pay rent for a separate factory; it dis-
courages the individual worker in the interest of those who have
the capital to hire a place for many workers; it thwarts independ-
ence; it makes an arbitrary rule; the Legislature might establish
uniform regulations to keep cigar factories of all sorts clean and
healthy, but it could not constitutionally prevent a man from
making cigars in a clean and healthy place, merely because some
part of the same building was used for human habitation. I
might take up each of the unsu ccessful attempts in turn and ex-
plain how the Legislature might have accomplished its design so
far as reasonable without violating a constitutional principle, but
it would not be profitable. One can readily see that a slight ex-
tension of the legislative assertion of power would greatly curtail
the reasonable activities of a large part of the community. If it
is constitutional to prohibit the manufacture of cigars in certain
houses, it might be permissible to confine the manufacture to cer-
tain places, or to certain individuals; a restriction of the hours of
labor of bakers or of women might prevent bakers or women
9 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y., 271.
10 Hauser v. North British, etc., Co., 206 N. Y., 455.
"1 Fisher Co. v. Woods, 187 N. Y., 90.
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from making a living if carried farther; the admission of the
Legislature's power to compel one man to support another in case
of physical misfortune might authorize the Legislature to take
away one man's property and give it to those without misfor-
tune; if soliciting insurance be confined to those in the real estate
business, it might be confined to men with one arm or with red
hair, or it might be confined to those specifically named as the
recipients of legislative favor. And so, if we admit the Legisla-
ture's unrestricted power, we leave it altogether free to destroy
all freedom of action. If it can, without judicial interference
take property without due process of law, it can also institute
cruel and unusual punishments; it can declare that the office of
assemblyman shall continue through life and be heriditary; it can
abolish all elections; it can repeal the Constitution. Now, I can
conceive and advance reasons why each of the unconstitutional
laws cited might have been held within the legislative power un-
der the Constitution. I could cite two cases, from different
States,12 in which it has been said by way of argument, in one
that the Legislature might constitutionally prohibit the practice
of medicine by men with red hair and in another that such action
would transcend legislative power. this is merely an indication
of the different way in which different minds look at the same
problem, the one apparently considering that there is obviously
such a lack of relation between red hair and medical skill, that
the legislative 'action is an arbitrary discrimination between the
rights of men with red hair and those with white, black, yellow
or no hair, the other contending that the Legislature has an un-
restricted right to determine the relation between the color of
red hair and medical capacity. While we may disagree with the
reasoning in a particular case, that is small ground for overthrow-
ing our institutions. Many of us think it reprehensible to nullify
a legislative act, which imposes on an employer, the necessity of
supporting all of his disabled workmen, while we might view with
alarm legislation which imposed upon a colonel the duty of sup-
porting all of his regiment injured in battle. Yet.the principles of
the two cases are fundamentally the same, for a single employer
can not as easily add to the cost of his product to make up the
cost of the keep of his injured employees, as a colonel of a regi-
ment could levy upon the surrounding country to keep up his pen-
sions.
12 Cf. Ex Parte Spinney, 10 Nev., 323, per Beatty, J., and dissenting
opinion of Morse, J., People v. Phippin, 70 Mich., 6.
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THE JUDICIARY IS NOT AT FAULT.
There are then two great fundamental causes for the present
widespread dissatisfaction with the judiciary; each the result of
a determination on the part of a large element of the community,
to wreak its individual will on others in the community, regardless
of its effect upon those others; and the Judiciary is blamed be-
cause it grants to those others the protection, which in the opin-
ion of the Judiciary the Constitution was designed to afford. The
disapproval is the disapproval of disappointment; it is easier to
abuse a judge than to change a Constitution. But the thing which
stands in the way is tha latter not the former and the former
should not be blamed for obeying his oath.
Insofar as I have considered the two subjects which I have
discussed the evils and the weaknesses are not to any great extent
in the Judiciary; it is the strength of the latter which has given
rise to the discussion; it is the desire to weaken it, so that it will
bend the everlastng principles of justice to the immediate de-
mands of a clamorous multitude. As I see it, the evil is in the
demand, and not in the Judiciary. The demand contemplates
that a united will of less than the whole people shall acomplish
its purpose in defiance instead of in harmony with fundamental
principles. If fundamental principles are to be changed, it should
be done through the Constitution and not through the Judiciary;
the Constitution is the word of the master, the Judiciary its ser-
vants. And the Constitution is itself not master. The people is
still master, but not a minority of the people. There are two rem-
edies, neither, however, applicable to the Judiciary, viz.: to change
the Constitution to embody the will of the people, but not of a
minority, or to direct the will of the people to accomplish desired
results in harmony with the Constitution. While the latter can be
done, the former should not be done; the resort to the former
sacrifices too much of experience in the interest of doubtful ex-
periment. I do not see any one of the purposes, whose particular
method has been disapproved by the Judiciary which might not
be constitutionally and wisely accomplished through properly con-
ceived constructive, as distinguished from destructive legislation;
legislation which would take into due consideration the just inter-
ests of all, instead of the selfish interests of a portion. Toleration
is the solution of many evils, which intoleration perpetuates.
Rather take constitutionalists into council, and devise a consti-
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tutional and just method of accomplishing desired reforms, in-
stead of denouncing their prejudices and precautions as matters
to be disregarded and overriden to offer the easiest way to a de-
sired or uncertain goal. To use but one illustration, the taxing
power can be properly and constitutionally invoked to pay civil
pensions to the injured soldiers of industry instead of quartering
them upon an employer, who may himself be wholly unable to
bear the burden of having his property taken without his fault
to answer for the misfortunes of those whom he has adequately
compensated for the service rendered during the term of their
employment. It is not the pensioning of disabled employers
which the Judiciary has found unconstitutional, but the despoil-
ing of the innocent employer in order to secure the fund for "so-
cial justice." I confess that I might find the institution of a sys-
tem of pensioning disabled employees in dangerous employments
at the expense of their innocent employers, constitutional, as a
lawful condition imposed upon particular enterprises because
they do threaten the peace of the community by their very danger,
and the condition might be constitutionally made the price of the
license to engage. But I cannot condemn a judge for finding
otherwise, on the theory that dangerous employments do not fall
outside of, the general category, and that it is a fundamental prin-
.ciple in our justice that a man's property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation, and that it cannot be taken
for private use without his wrongful act. If we let down this
bar and suffer it to be taken at the will of the Legislature, then
we will put all men in the community at the mercy of the Legis-
lature and abolish the established principles of the Constithtion;
this, the people may do, if 'they choose, but the Judiciary cannot
do it until they have the people's mandate constitutionally ex-
pressed and the Legislative edict is not the people's mandate, so
long as the Constitution prohibits the legislative act, and estab-
lishes the limit of legislative power Those who advocate the
abolition of constitutional restrictions upon legislative power.
merely do so, because the Legislature attempts to work their will.
If the Legislature should defy their will, they would not be so
ready to desert the Constitution or its principles established




The weakness and evil, then, is not in the Courts, but in meth-
ods of advocacy and legislative fiat in disregard of individual
claims to fair consideraton. This is no place to discuss the eco-
nomic dangers of taking one man's property and giving it to an.
other, illustrated in the case of so-called workingmen's compensa-
tion wrought through merely giving the working man a right to
prosecute a law suit against his employer, for their joint misfor-
tune. But it riay not be amiss to point out that a scheme of
workingmen's "compensation" which merely creates a right of
action, where none existed, and abolishes a defense hitherto rec-
ognized as fundamentally just, does not in fact give the injured
workingman the prompt relief which he needs, and it secures no
relief against an insolvent employer, or one who becomes insol-
vent during the term of so-called compensation; it does not elimi-
nate the ambulance choser nor the accident lawyer, it does not
disgorge the Court calendars, nor lessen the actual chances of
waste, delay and expense; it still permits a 50% lawyers' fee, and
it limits the size of verdicts ,so that they do not include damages
for this waste, delay and expense; while, on the other hand it
falsely assumes that all employers of labor are capitalists and can
readily stand the shock of the sudden increase of expense caused
by an unexpected, unavoidable and extensive casualty; it falsely
assumhes that the individual employer can distribute the cost of
such an accident to his customers by raising the price of his pro-
duct while in competition with another, whose experience of un-
avoidable accident has not yet arrived; it falsely assumes that the
individual employer can. fully protect himself, and the workman
at the same time realizes his dream of compensation, by insur-
ance in a company organized for profit and whose profit is en-
hanced by the number of defeated claims. In short, not only
does such legislation override the wisely conservative principle of
the protection of property to the extent of due process of law,
but it fails to give the workman cheap, certain and prompt relief,
while it diminishes the amount of recovery below its present rea-
sonable possibilities in case of wrongful act, and tends to hope-
lessly cripple the small employer, who enjoys credit and not
capital-; it tends to discourage the rise from the class of em-
ployees to employers, because it imposes an obligation which re-
quires capital to meet it; it fixes its eyes upon the larger capitalist
THE JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL RECALL
as an employer and overlooks the man struggling up from ob-
scurity. All of this for the time being the Judiciary has discour-
aged by a conscientious appeal to constitutional bars. The rem-
edy lies, not in the abandonment of civil pensions for injured
employers, but in the fairer distribution of the burden, so that
society meets its obligation, such as it is, and does not quarter its
soldiers on the struggling individual whose burden is thereby
iendered so overwhelming that both innocent employer and in-
jured employee succumb under it. The fairer distribution of the
burden would consist in the equitable exercise of the taxing
power, so that trades and employments could be classified accord-
ing to their hazard, and taxed by license fees graduated according
to proper factors, to raise an aggregate fund sufficient to meet
the aggregate demand; litigation should be avoided and insuranze,
with its element of private profit should be eliminated. The in-
jured employees should receive all of the fund, except the actual
expenses of its administration, and there should be no profit in
delay and disappointment, as there is in litigation to defeat clans.
Courts, with their expensive and formal procedure, with their law,
their lawyers, and their attendants should not have any function
in the distribution of the fund; the whole thing should be ad-
ministrative and not judicial. The fault which is now attributed
to the Courts, really lies in inefficient legislation, which does not
meet the actual need, but attacks a fundamental principle in our
institutions without accomplishing the assumed social justice,
even to the part of the community which it assumes to aid.
The recently enacted Workingmen's Compensation Law in
New York 3 still only partially recognizes these principles, but it
gives much more heed to them than its unconstitutional prede-
cessor.
The criticism which has been leveled at the Court of Appeals
of New York for its unpopular decision in the so-called Ives
case, 14 under the former workingmen's compensation law,1 is not
well founded and should be answered and discouraged by those
who know enough to do it. Personally I could have found suffi-
cient reason in the facts of this case to reach a different conclu-
sion upon the law, but there is really more protection to the in.
dividual, be he' rich or poor, and to the happiness of the com-
13 Laws 1913, c. 816, Act Dec. 16, 1913.
14 IVes v. South Buffalo R. R. Co., 201. N. Y., 271.
1 Laws of N. Y., 1910, c. 674.
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munity, in a Constitution which restrains the injustice of num-
bers and in a judicial branch which closely scrutinizes arbitrary
acts of legislation, than in a complaisant or powerless Judiciary,
which passes over in silence a piece of unconstitutional legislative
injustice.
THE "'WILL OF THE PEOPLE" IS EMBODIED IN CONSTITUTIONS,
We should unmask and denounce the plausible contention that
what is demanded is the accomplishment of the will of the people;
What is demanded is that our so-called representatives elected to
the Legislature shall have unrestricted sway over the fortunes,
the lives and the happiness of the people, without interference or
effectual criticism from our other elected representatives, the
Tudiciary. Any such rule will be inevitably fraught with danger.
For our Legislatures in the past have not distinguished them-
selves by any high regard either for constitutional principles, or
the rights of individuals. The present universal agitation is
founded more upon the widespread exposure of graft, than on
any other fact; and successful graft owes its acemplishments, not
to a corrupt Judiciary, but in the most instances to corrupt
municipal legislatures.
The following extract from the address of Louis Marshall,
Esq., to the recent High Court of Impeachment in New York, is
pertinent to the present discussion and deserves wide circulation
in this connection. He said:
"That would be a sad day in our judicial history when reli-
ance upon th_ Constitution and the law of the land were to be
regarded as technical, or were to be condemned and deemed un-
worthy. So long as our people may proudly boast that this a
Government of laws and not of men, so long will its liberties be
preserved and its institutions perpetuated. But whenever the time
shall come when the ignorance of the mob, its passions and its
prejudices, or when considerations of mere political expediency,
may prevail against the word of the organic law, when the time-
honored concepts of 'due process of law' and the law of the land
shall be treated as mere jests, and become the objects of derision
and contempt, when the usurpation by one branch of the Gov-
eminent of the powers which belong to another, may be regarded
with equanimity, then the hour of disintegration will be at hand,
and it will only require one endowed with the necessary audacity
to ride rough-shod over the ruins of the Constitution, and that sys-
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tem of Government which has made of us a people happy, law-
abiding and free, will give way to the hysterical caprices of
tyranny and despotism.
"We are confident that this tribunal will not shrink from the
duty of applying the Constitution, regardless of the outcries of
those who, for ulterior reasons, are prepared to strike it down if
it stands in the way of the accomplishment of their selfish pur-
poses. It is one of the glories of our Court of Appeals, that it
has .steadfastly dlosed its ears to the discordant ravings of those
who have from time to time demanded that it do violence to the
Constitution and the law, in order that the victims they have
sought to immolate might not escape their vengeance. It has
never been terrorized or coerced by threats or cajoled by flattery
or influenced by ridicule, or by the fear of unpopularity, into do-
ing an act of positive injustice, and the sneer which regards
the taking of .shelter, under the Constitution, as a technicality,
has never led it to withdraw its protection from him who sought
THE SELECTION OF JUDGES, AND THE PERSONNEL OF THE JUDICIARY.
There is a third cause of the discontent with our Judiciary,
which is not usually recognized, and that is the selection of judges
for purely partisan reasons, in disregard of emin:ent fitness for
the position. The knowledge that judicial position is the gift
of an individual, whether President or boss, for the benefit of a
party organization or as a reward for partisan service deprives
the incumbent of respect in the position, and casts suspicion upon
the disinterestedness of his decisions. A man who is a partisan
of the Bench is not apt to be impartial when on it; and a man
who has earned his selection by subserviency is not apt to distin-
guish his occupancy by independence. One may entertain his in-
dividual opinions, and they may not be correct; but when he in-
augurates a widespread inquiry and finds those opinions echoed
by numerous others, not likely to be influenced by the same in-
.tances or causes, he has substantial reason to believe that his
views are well founded. Mr. Everett V. Abbot" and myself
about three years ago made serious effort to secure a widespread
expression of views upon the Judiciary; we directed inquiries to
every State; and we got numerous replies from a widely extended
16 Author of Justice and the Modern Law, Haughton, Mifflin Co., Bos-
ton, 1913.
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field. We then tabulated, and analyzed those replies, with a result
which we published in the American Law Review for July and
Ajugust, 1911.1' The questions sought to learn how the Judiciary
was regarded in all of the communities reached, both by lawyers
and laymen. The answers received were varied; they showed
that in some commonwealths and communities they were re-
garded with esteem, confidence and admiration; in others, some
of the members were severely criticised. In its ultimate analysis
the criticism might be summarized, in the two words, faulty per-
sonnel. In not one of these replies did we hear of any abuse of
the power of the injunction, or of any usurpation of the power to
retard social welfare by declaring legislative acts unconstitutional.
These reasons loom large now because they have been agitated
targely to serve partisan purposes, and are issues upon which am-
bitious individuals may themselves ride into power. But what
we heard from men of judgment and with the power of observa-
tion, but with no axes to grind and no propaganda to advance,
was a reflection upon the kind of men that are in some instances
elected to the Bench-men who for on reason and another re-
lated to their personal qualifications, were either deemed unfit, or
who, at least,. did not distinguish the office. The personal unfit-
ness, though it required a long catalogue to specify its peculiar
character in individual cases, obviously had a single result, it de-
stroyed respect for the particular incumbent's administration of
his office. .This unfitness of individual judges reported by quiet
observers, not distinguished as malcontents showed that in a large
measure'those who have the privilege of selecting judges are doing
their work poorly. In some cases it was a President of the
United States, who in those cases, according to our informants,
was considered to have chosen members of his own party, as a
party reward, but without regard to distinguished fitness; in such
cases the appointing power was known and could be indicated;
in other cases, it was clearly indicated that the incumbent was
elected by popular vote. The impression was gained that there
was little or no complaint where the appointing power was lodged
in the Governor of a State. It seemed that the failure readily
fell into two categories, selections by the Federal appointing
power in communities where his party was not dominant, and
members of an elected Judiciary. But in no case was the discon-
17 The Judiciary and the Administration of the Law, by Everett V.
Abbot and Charles A. Boston.
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tent with the Judiciary, it was with the individuals; and in no
case was it caused by their attitude toward injunctions or "social
welfare" legislation. In every instance it was the criticism of
the personal short-comings of an individual; and in every case, it
was either lack of professional attainments or personal qualifica-
tions. In no case was there any criticism which could be rem-
edied by the recall of judicial decisions; nor was it intimated that
the recall of individual judges would lead to the selection of bet-
ter equipped successors.
THE TRUE REMEDY.
There is no cure for lack of professional attainments in candi-
dates for the Bench, except to educate the people to demand them.
Until the people demand them, there can be no certainty that
President or boss will insist upon them, or make fitness or profes-
sional ability a ground of selection. Before countenancing the
nostrums of recalling judges or judicial decisions, I would urge
a propaganda that instead of judges who will administer the
"people's will," the people select judges whose professional abil-
ity and personal equipment distinguish them as eminently fitted
for the judicial office.
The short-comings which were reported to us, insofar as they
did not lie in lack of ability, lay in a lax appreciation of profes-
sional ethics. There is just as much need of canons of profes-
sional ethics for judges, as for lawyers. The American Bar As-
sociation has failed or refused to perceive this, though it has been
repeatedly brought to its attention. The Pennsylvania Bar As-
sociation has recognized it and has adopted canons of judicial
ethics. When judges know, and people know, that they must
measure up to certain simple and well-defined practical standards,
there will be fewer short-comings to chronicle, and greater confi-
dence in the Judiciary as an institution, the result of greater
honor and respect to its m-mbers. We all can appreciate the
uniform confidence in the absolute probity and utter dignity and
impartiality with which the Chief Justice in New York recently
presided over its High Court of Impeachment. Not a shadow of
question fell upon his administration of his office, and every one
looked to the force of his character as a bulwark in influencing
the Court, composed in part of elected legislators, to reach a
.proper judicial and impartial determination.
What would we ever hear of the recall of judges or decisions,
if every judge everywhere were as conspicuous an example to in-
YALE LAW JOURNAL
spire confidence and admiration. Would not the whole move-
ment completely collapse, if the people were made to know and
feel that their judges, like their priests, their ministers and their
chosen family physicians, were paragons of professional ability
and personal integrity?
Whatever may be the rallying cry, the fundamental cause, is
not with the judicial institution, but with the bosses. Whoever
the boss may be, or whatever guise he may take, he is at fault in
choosing men for judicial position, who so far fail to command
respect, that anyone can doubt their purity of purpose. When
we succeeded in implanting in the average man, the perception that
the occupants of judicial positions are men in every way worthy of
the position, then this agitation will cease, though it may spend
itself earlier. On the other hand, if the average man is im-
pressed that his judge is one whom he can not trust, no recall,
whether of judge or decision, will satisfy him. And to beget this
confidence the judges must deserve it. Itis not the will of the
people as it may be understood by the man with his ear to the
ground, but honesty, ability, industry and iipartiality, which
should dictate the course of the judge. And it is honesty, abil-
ity, industry and impartiality which will steady the judicial de-
partment and hold it free from the influences that now seek to
make it the weather vane of popular fancy.
It is not semi-monastic solitude, traditional veneration of the
Constitution, or a natural instinct to preserve property rights,
which has weakened the Judiciary, but the fact that the people
were not individually impressed with the wonderful integrity,
the amazing ability, the great industry and the utter impartiality
of the Bench. There are communities in which they are so im-
pressed; and in any community in which they are so impressed,
any attack upon the Judiciary or its powers is doomed to sure
failure.
The faults of delay and complex procedure are not the faults
of the Judiciary, but of the Legislature. It is to be hoped that
these will be remedied by the agencies which are now at work in
many parts of the United States to simplify procedure and pro-
mote remedial justice.
The essense of this individual opinion of mine is:
1. That the power of the Judiciary to declare laws unconsti-
tutional is beneficial and is not open to just criticism.
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2. That there is a growing tendency in Legislatures to pass
unconstitutional legislation which should not be encouraged.
3. That all legislation necessary or desirable for social wel-
fare may be passed, without violating any fundamental provision
of the Constitution.
4. That the causes of the present discontent are:
(a.) The desire of certain persons to enjoy the unrestricted
right to do violence, without the exercise of the restraining
power of a Court to protect the victim;
(b.) The desire to benefit one class at the expense of an-
other but innocent class, and without distributing the burden
where it rightfully belongs and may be constitutionally placed;
(c.) The too frequent lack in members of the Judiciary of
those qualities of ability and integrity which command respect
for their judicial decisions.
5. Of these causes for discontent, the first contention is in-
herently unjust and cannot by right thinking men be conceded;
The second object can be and should be constitutionally
achieved without assailing or curtailing the powers of the
Judiciary;
The third cause can only be removed by educating the people
to demand the best of material in the judicial office;
The faculty and expensive procedure where it exists is not
chargeable to the Judiciary, but to the Legislature which is em-
powered to correct it.
Charles A. Boston.
New Ybrk City.
